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The Role of Deportation in the 
Incarceration of Immigrants 
Kristin F. Butcher and Anne Morrison Piehl 
9.1  Introduction 
The small empirical literature on the effects of immigration on crime 
and criminal justice has produced several stylized facts. While any amount 
of immigration must increase the total number of crimes in the United 
States, Butcher and Piehl (1  998b) reported  that increasing immigration 
did not increase crime rates in the largest US. cities. In an analysis of the 
effects of immigration on the behavior of the native born, Grogger (1998) 
showed that there did not appear to be “spillovers” from the labor market 
competition  of  immigrants  onto  the  criminality  of  African  American 
youth. Butcher and Piehl (1998a) found that more-recent immigrants ap- 
peared to be less criminal (relative to the native born) than earlier arrivals. 
This is in spite of  the fact that recent immigrants fare relatively poorly in 
the labor market. Furthermore, the same paper documented that immi- 
grants were much less likely to be institutionalized than one would expect 
given their relatively low levels of education. 
Kristin F.  Butcher is assistant professor of economics at Boston College. Anne Morrison 
Piehl is associate professor of public policy in the Kennedy School of Government at Har- 
vard University and a faculty research fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
The authors are grateful to Daniel Kanstroom and David Cory for help with interpreta- 
tion of the immigration laws. They thank John Berecochea and the Research Branch of the 
California Department of Corrections for access to and assistance with the data. The find- 
ings presented here should not be construed as representing the views of the State of Califor- 
nia or the Department of Corrections. Mark Fassold provided excellent research assistance. 
The authors appreciate helpful comments from David Card, Jeffrey Grogger, Hilary Hoynes, 
Stephen Legomsky, Gilbert Metcalf, Dan Noelle, and seminar participants at UC Berkeley, 
Tufts University, and the NBER conference. Butcher appreciates support from the Industrial 
Relations Section at Princeton. Piehl appreciates the support of the Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation. All errors are the authors’. 
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This literature has left unanswered many questions relevant to public 
policy about immigration and, in particular, about immigrants in the crim- 
inal justice system. Policies toward immigrants who commit crimes in the 
United States may affect which immigrants choose to enter the country, 
the extent to which immigrants become naturalized citizens, and the extent 
to which immigrants in the country engage in illegal activity. While these 
are important topics, there are more basic questions about current condi- 
tions about which we know very little. Do immigrants and natives commit 
similar types of offenses? Are the foreign born treated  differently than 
natives within the criminal justice system? And if so, how does that affect 
costs? In this paper, we  address these questions while documenting the 
legal consequences of criminal activity for immigrants and how these con- 
sequences have changed over time. 
There are many reasons to be concerned about the treatment of criminal 
aliens in the United States. First, the past 25 years have seen the largest 
numbers of immigrants since the early 1900s and the quadrupling of the 
prison population. Consequently, the absolute number of incarcerated im- 
migrants is large and growing. Second, congressional legislation has dra- 
matically expanded the types of criminal acts that “qualify” noncitizens 
for deportation, while at the same time increasing the resources for identi- 
fying and processing criminal aliens. These acts impose conditions on the 
states, which have traditionally maintained primary responsibility for law 
enforcement. The consequences of these laws, intended or not, are consid- 
erable. Third, several court cases have restricted the use of certain modes 
of punishment for noncitizens, for example, early release and low-security 
facilities, which are widely used for citizens. While not everyone will be 
concerned about horizontal equity associated with differential punishment 
by nativity for similar criminal acts, concern about the efficient use of the 
public purse is widespread. To the extent that costs of the restrictions on 
the terms of confinement are not offset by savings due to increased vigi- 
lance in implementing deportation, the increase in the use of public re- 
sources in the incarceration of aliens could be substantial. 
We analyze the experience of one jurisdiction (California) particularly 
affected by the costs of incarcerating foreign-born inmates. While Califor- 
nia may not be representative of the nation, it is emblematic of this partic- 
ular social policy issue. Using data on all new admissions to state prisons 
for three points in time, we  analyze the offenses of the foreign born and 
of natives. We  find that the foreign born are very different from native- 
born inmates in terms of their crime mix, with foreigners much more likely 
to be serving time for drug offenses. The Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) appears to be much more involved with the incarcerated 
foreign born in 1996 than it was in  1986. This is the result of the war on 
drugs as well as changes in public law and in the level of resources appro- 
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ignated by the California Department of Corrections (CADOC) to be re- 
leased  to  INS  custody  (called  “INS holds”)  had  sentences  about  40 
percent longer than natives in 1986, which may reflect that those foreigners 
had committed  more  serious offenses. By  1996, the definition of  “de- 
portable” was expanded such that it should cover all noncitizens in the 
CADOC. We find that, even at the end of the period, those foreign born 
with INS holds served substantially longer terms (conditional upon sen- 
tence  length)  than natives  or  other  “similar” foreigners. These longer 
terms of incarceration impose substantial costs on the state. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 9.2 compares foreign-born 
inmates to native-born inmates in California. Section 9.3 considers federal 
jurisdiction. Section 9.4 describes the legal and law enforcement environ- 
ment with respect to noncitizens involved in criminal activity. Section 9.5 
contains a multivariate analysis of criminal justice outcomes in California, 
and section 9.6 concludes. 
9.2  California Inmates: Foreign Born and Native Born 
This section introduces the data used in the paper and provides a de- 
scription  of  inmates  in  California  prisons  over  time,  focusing  on the 
differences between foreign-born and U.S.-born offenders. 
9.2.1  California Department of Corrections Data 
We  use administrative data from the CADOC from  1986, 1990, and 
1996. These are administrative data used to keep track of inmates while 
they are in the custody of the Department of Corrections. The admission 
cohorts contain all individuals who were admitted to the prison  system 
with new crimes in each year.’ These data were constructed from the CA- 
DOC master file as of June 1997, so we  observe whether an inmate was 
released by that date. We focus on the subsample of offenders with com- 
pleted terms when we analyze differences in time served across groups. 
Because the purpose of these data is to keep track of inmates, the num- 
ber of variables included in the master data set is enormous and rich in 
details about the inmates’ appearance (e.g., hair and eye color) and move- 
ments (e.g., to and from the dentist). However, many of these variables are 
not of interest here, and much information that we would like is unavail- 
able. The available demographic data include the inmates’ age at admis- 
sion, race and ethnicity, and country of origin. Additionally, we  have in- 
formation on the principal commitment offense category, the length of 
sentence, and the actual time served for those who are released during 
the period. 
1. The restriction to “new admissions” means that offenders entering prisons for violating 
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There is potentially important information that we  do not have, most 
notably criminal history. The data also contain no information on educa- 
tional attainment, which for some purposes is a useful control variable. 
Also, we  have no information on presentencing confinement or behavior 
in prison, both of which could impact the time actually served for a partic- 
ular sentence length. We discuss the impact of these data shortcomings on 
interpretation as they arise. 
While we  have information on country of origin, we  have no informa- 
tion on citizenship status. In the labor economics literature, it is common 
to use the terms “foreign born” and “immigrant” interchangeably. Here, 
however, it is important to recognize the differences. The foreign born who 
have become citizens are not subject to deportation, so one would not 
expect changes in policies surrounding deportation to affect their criminal 
justice outcomes. Secondly, some of the foreign-born inmates may be indi- 
viduals who were expecting to be in the United States temporarily (e.g., 
tourists or business travelers), some of whom may have entered for the 
purpose of committing a crime and are therefore not “immigrants.”’ 
When we  analyze those inmates who have been released, we  break the 
foreign born into three groups, depending on their status with the INS. 
When a foreigner is sentenced, the INS is supposed to begin proceedings 
to determine his or her deportation status. If the INS either determines 
that  the individual  is  deportable or is  continuing its investigation into 
whether he or she is deportable, an INS “hold” is placed on that person. 
Our data contain information on whether someone is in this “INS hold” 
category. For some individuals, an INS hold  was placed on them after 
their release date, because the INS did not discover until late in the process 
that the person was potentially deportable. We label those with INS holds 
prior to their release from prison as “INS hold.” Those with holds after 
their release date are labeled “late holds.” Those with no INS holds on 
their records are labeled “no hold.” 
We dropped a number of observations from the sample because of miss- 
ing or invalid data. Individuals who had an invalid year for admission or 
release, those who were released on the same day as they were admitted, 
and people who were sentenced for less than one year were dropped. This 
latter exclusion is because individuals are only supposed to be remanded 
to the prison system for terms of one year and higher (others are remanded 
to jails operated by  counties). “Lifers”-those  in for murder-were  ex- 
cluded because they do not have determinate  sentence^.^ 
2. If, for example, many of the incarcerated aliens were admitted on tourist or business 
visas, there would be little implication that the United States should change the number or 
criteria for admission of those seeking to become permanent resident aliens. Unfortunately, 
information on visa status is not available. 
3. California’s 1982 Determinate Sentencing Law requires specific terms of punishment 
for all offenses other than murder. The actual time served for those with indeterminate sen- 
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We further excluded some individuals because of difficulty in interpret- 
ing their information. We  dropped individuals whose principal commit- 
ment offense was “escape,” since we do not have information on the crime 
that landed them in prison in the first place. We also deleted people who 
served more than 100 percent of their sentence and those whose sentenc- 
ing date was later than their admission date. The first group is likely to be 
those with extremely bad  behavior while in prison. The latter group is 
those who were sentenced for an additional offense while in prison. Since 
we  have no information on behavior in prison, these individuals compli- 
cate the analysis. Finally, we  dropped individuals born in outlying areas 
of the United States (Puerto Rico), and the native born who had an INS 
hold placed on their record, since neither fit cleanly into the groups under 
study.4  In all of the subsamples we analyze, only 3 to 4 percent are lost be- 
cause of these sample restrictions. 
9.2.2  Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of table 9.1 shows information for those men admitted in 1986, 
1990, and 1996. The number of men admitted in 1986 was approximately 
21,000. By  1996, the number of new admissions had increased to about 
39,000. The fraction of the admission cohorts that was foreign born also 
increases, rising from about 19 percent in 1986, to 25 percent in  1990, to 
27 percent in 1996. While foreign-born men represent a sizable fraction of 
the flows into prison in California, they also represent a large fraction of 
the population overall. In 1980, the foreign born made up about 18 per- 
cent of the 18-to-40-year-old male population (roughly comparable to the 
group most likely to be in prison); by  1990, they had risen to about 24 
percent  of this p~pulation.~  So foreign-born men’s  representation in the 
admission flows into prison in California is roughly equal to their repre- 
sentation in the state as a whole, despite the fact that based on their aver- 
age education, for example, one might expect them to have higher incar- 
ceration rates (see Butcher and Piehl 1998a). 
There are substantial differences between the characteristics of native- 
born and foreign-born men in these admission cohorts. Foreign-born men 
are slightly younger than native-born men, and this difference increases 
slightly over the time periods studied here. There are striking differences 
in the race and ethnicity categories, and these differences increase over 
time. Among the native born, the percentage white non-Hispanic was 37 
percent in 1986 and rose slightly to 40 percent in 1996. Among the foreign 
born, the overwhelming majority of inmates are Hispanic. In 1986, His- 
panics represent 72 percent of the foreign-born inmates admitted. This 
4. In neither of these two cases do these omissions affect the substantive results. Dropping 
these final two categories of inmates eases the discussion of the results. 
5. By  1996, over 30 percent of the 18- to 44-year-olds (male and female) in California were 
foreign born (published tabulations from the 1996 March CPS). See http://www.bls.census 
.gov/cpsl. Table 9.1  Descriptive Statistics for Admissions Cohorts 
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30.98  31.49 
(0.185)  (0.725) 
0.3968  0.2180* 
(0.01 18)  (0.0359) 
0.2986  0.0677* 
(0.0110)  (0.0219) 
0.2526  0.5113* 
(0.0105)  (0.0435) 
0.2363  0.4962* 
(0.0103)  (0.0435) 
32.75  30.74 
(0.577)  (1.222) 
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3 1.83  32.69 
(0.136)  (0.524) 
0.3807  0.1732* 
(0.0086)  (0.0238) 
0.3857  0.0787* 
(0.0086)  (0.0169) 
0.1981  0.5787* 
(0.0070)  (0.0310) 
0.1757  0.5079* 
(0.0067)  (0.0314) 
29.33  33.78* 
(0.323)  (1.596) 




























































34. I3  33.55 
(0.118)  (0.390) 
0.41  11  0.1179* 
(0.0075)  (0.0151) 
0.3387  0.0437* 
(0.0072)  (0.0096) 
0.1947  0.6638* 
(0.0060)  (0.022  1) 
0.1022  0.5218* 
(0.0046)  (0.0234) 
30.54  37.70* 
(0.377)  (1.574) 
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Table 9.1  (continued) 
1986  1990  1996 
Native  Foreign  Native  Foreign  Native  Foreign 











0.4866  0.3459* 
(0.0121)  (0.0414) 
0.1409  0.1053 
(0.0084)  (0.0267) 
0.2724  0.4812* 
(0.0107)  (0.0435) 
0.1234  0.1203 
(0.0079)  (0.0283) 
0.0471  0.0301 
(0.0051)  (0.0149) 
0.0128  O* 
(0.0027) 
0  0.1805* 
(0.0335) 
1,718  133 
0.0718 
(0.0060) 
0.3543  0.3307 
(0.0084)  (0.0296) 
0.0964  0.0827 
(0.0052)  (0.0173) 
0.4747  0.5157 
(0.0088)  (0.0314) 
0.2308  0.1299 
(0.0074)  (0.021  1) 
0.0258  0.0276 
(0.0028)  (0.0103) 
0.0044  O* 
(0.0012) 
0  0.5827* 
(0.0310) 
3,215  254 
0.0732 
(0,0044) 
0.3621  0.2336* 
(0.0073)  (0.0198) 
0.1158  0.1179 
(0.0049)  (0.0151) 
0.4560  0.5721* 
(0.0076)  (0.0231) 
0.2594  0.1507* 
(0.0067)  (0.0167) 
0.0146  0.0262 
(0.0018)  (0.0075) 
0.0032  0.0022 
(0.0009)  (0.0022) 
0  0.3319* 
(0.0310) 
4,325  458 
0.0958 
(0.0043) 
Note: Authors’ calculations from California Department of Corrections data. See text for description 
of the data and sample restrictions. Mexican is a subset of Hispanic. Drug possession is a subset of the 
drug offense category. “Other” offenses are omitted. An asterisk indicates the mean is different from 
the mean in the previous column at the 5 percent level of statistical significance.  Numbers in parenthe- 
ses are standard errors. 
rose to 85 percent in 1990, and 87 percent in 1996. Hispanics, both native 
and foreign born, were predominantly of Mexican descent. 
One of the unanswered questions in the literature on immigration and 
crime is whether the foreign born and natives commit different types of 
crimes.6  These data allow us to address this question, at least in part. These 
data, of course, do not allow us to answer questions  about those who 
commit crimes but are never apprehended or convicted. To the extent that 
there are differences in  apprehension and conviction rates between the 
foreign born and natives, these data will give a distorted view of the crimes 
committed by these two groups. 
There are statistically significant differences, in all years of admission 
data, in the types of crimes for which foreigners and natives are committed 
6. Smith and Edmonston (1997) show the distribution of offense types for the nation as a 
whole, by  citizenship. Noncitizens are more likely (than citizens) to serve time for drug 
offenses and less likely to serve time for property and violent offenses. Denominating by  the 
male population  age  18-54,  they find that noncitizens have incarceration rates for violent 
offenses about half those of citizens; for property offenses, noncitizens have incarceration 
rates about one-third the native rate; while for drug offenses, noncitizens have double the 
incarceration rate of natives (Smith and Edmonston 1997, 388). 358  Kristin F.  Butcher and Anne Morrison Piehl 
to prison. The foreign born were less likely to be in prison for property 
and assault offenses. In 1986, they were less likely to be serving time for 
sex offenses. Although the fraction of the admission cohort that was incar- 
cerated for manslaughter is low overall (and falling), the foreign born were 
slightly more likely to have this as their principal commitment offense. 
There is a striking difference in the fraction sentenced for drug offenses. 
In 1986, 20 percent of the natives and 33 percent of the foreign born were 
committed for drug offenses. By  1996, this rose to 32 percent of the native 
born and 46 percent of the foreign born. The category “drug possession” 
is a subset of the “drug offenses” group. The foreign born were signifi- 
cantly less likely in  1990 and 1996 to be incarcerated solely on posses- 
sion charges. 
In 1986 and 1990, foreign-born men had significantly shorter sentences 
than native-born men. The average sentence length among the native born 
was 47 months in  1986, fell to 41 months in  1990, and rose again to 45 
months in 1996. Among the foreign born, the average sentence length was 
43 months in 1986,40 months in 1990, and 45 months in 1996.  The shorter 
sentences for the foreign born in 1986 and 1990 may reflect differences in 
the offense types. The increase in the relative sentence length up to equal- 
ity with the native born by 1996 may be due to several factors: changes in 
the offense type or severity, changes in the enforcement and punishment of 
certain offenses, or changes in the treatment of immigrants per se. These 
possibilities are explored in section 9.4. 
Near the bottom of panel A of table 9.1 is the fraction of the foreign 
born with an INS hold on their records. As described previously, this indi- 
cates that the INS had either determined that the individual is deportable7 
or was in the process of investigating his or her status. The fraction of 
the foreign-born population  that has an INS hold  on record  increased 
dramatically over this time period, rising from approximately 30 percent 
in  1986, to 68 percent in  1990, to 75 percent in  1996. In addition, the 
swiftness with  which INS hold  orders are placed  increased  as well. In 
1986, 75 percent of those inmates who would eventually have INS holds 
(including those for whom INS holds were filed after their release) had 
those holds on record within 766 days. In 1990, 75 percent of those who 
would eventually have INS holds placed on their records were identified 
within 152 days. 
Panel A  of table 9.2 gives details on the offense categories, sentence 
length, and actual time served for four groups: the native born and three 
subgroups of the foreign born. The data here are for the men admitted in 
1986 and 1990 and released within six years of admission. Restricting the 
7. Technically, some in this category may be “excludable” rather than “deportable.” “Ex- 
clusion” applies to those foreigners who are in the United States awaiting formal admission, 
such as refugees. They may be deemed excludable and returned to their country of origin. Table 9.2  Descriptive Statistics for Inmates Released within Six Years of Admission, by Admission Year 
1986  1990 
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~41 Table 9.2  (continued) 
1986  1990 
Foreign Born  Foreign Born 
No  INS  Late  No  INS  Late 
Native  Hold  Hold  Hold  Native  Hold  Hold  Hold 



















































B.  Women 
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147  9 
Note: Authors’ calculations from California Department of Corrections data. See text for description of the data and sample restrictions. Drug possession 
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analysis in  this way allows us comparable groups for the 1986 and 1990 
admission  cohorts. The vast majority  of  inmates  serve fewer than six 
years-from  96.5 percent to 99.7 percent of our various admission co- 
horts. Nonetheless, these results are not generalizable to the inmate popu- 
lation serving the longest terms.8 
Since most inmates serve fewer than six years, the means for most vari- 
ables are essentially the same as in panel A of table 9.1. Here we focus on 
time served but repeat some other variables so they can be compared for 
a consistent  sample. For example, the crime mix  is somewhat different 
from the earlier table. 
The foreign born are divided into the three categories described earlier: 
those with no INS hold, those with an INS hold on record, and those for 
whom the INS hold was placed on their record after their release to parole 
(“late hold”). In 1986, the “INS hold” group had by  far the highest sen- 
tence length, averaging 54 months. Those foreign born without holds, or 
those deemed deportable after release, had the lowest sentences (33 and 
27  months, respectively). Under the California Determinate Sentencing 
Law, an inmate is supposed to serve at least 40 percent of his sentence. In 
practice, actual time served in prison depends on several factors. The exact 
amount depends on rewards for behavior in prison, often referred to as 
“good time.” In addition, some of those admitted to prison were not able 
to make bail and thus were confined in county jails prior to their sentenc- 
ing. These individuals may receive “credit” for this presentencing  con- 
finement and, as a result, may not serve as much time in the state system. 
These complications notwithstanding,  the correlation  between sentence 
length and actual time served is strong. The INS-hold foreigners served 
25 months in 1986, compared to 18 months for the native born. Foreigners 
without INS holds served 14 months, and “late holds” served 11 months. 
There is also evidence that in 1986 the INS-hold foreigners were commit- 
ted for more serious crimes. A higher proportion of them were incarcer- 
ated for assault, manslaughter, and sex offenses. In 1986, deportation ap- 
pears to have been pursued largely for the most serious offenders. 
By  1990, quite a lot had changed. The immigrants with INS holds had 
sentences that were only slightly higher than the native born (39 months 
versus 36 months). The offense distribution for the “INS holds” changed 
as well. Now 54 percent were incarcerated for drug offenses, and the pro- 
portion incarcerated for assault dropped well  below that for the native 
born and slightly below that for the other groups of foreign born. The 
proportion committed for manslaughter fell from 9 percent in 1986 to 3.4 
percent in 1990, which is below the rate for the native born. The propor- 
tion of sex offenders has also fallen below that for the native born. 
In all, panel A of table 9.1 and panel A of table 9.2 suggest that there 
8. The restriction excludes 2-5  percent of  men and less than 1 percent of women. 362  Kristin F. Butcher and Anne Morrison Piehl 
has been a significant increase in the proportion of the foreign-born prison 
population  that  is  “deportable.” Panel A  of  table 9.2 suggests that the 
types of crimes committed  by this “deportable” group has shifted from 
serious violent  crimes to more drug offenses. Section 9.4 below details 
some of the reasons this segment of the foreign-born inmate population 
increased so dramatically during this time period, and why the principal 
commitment offenses may have changed. Before moving to that section, 
we examine the analogous data for women. 
Panel B of table 9.1 shows the fraction foreign born, demographic infor- 
mation, and offense distribution for women in the 1986, 1990, and 1996 
admission cohorts. Note that the sample sizes are dramatically smaller for 
women than for men. Although the number of incarcerated  women has 
been  increasing,  by  1996 they  still represented  only  10 percent  of  the 
prison admissions. The next striking thing to note is the fraction foreign 
born: in 1986,7 percent of the women were foreign born; by 1996, this in- 
creased to approximately 10 percent. By  1996, forcign-born women made 
up about 25 percent  of the female population  in Calif~rnia.~  It is clear 
that foreign-born women are vastly underrepresented in the inmate inflow 
rates. Foreigners  with an INS hold  on record were  18 percent  of those 
admitted in 1986, 58 percent in 1990, and 33 percent in 1996. It is difficult 
to know if this fluctuation reflects changes in enforcement or changes in 
the underlying population, or if it is merely due to the small samples. The 
small sample sizes for women limit the extent of the analyses we can per- 
form. Throughout the paper, we report only as much as we feel the data 
justify. 
Relative to the male inmates, women were more likely to be incarcerated 
for property and drug offenses and less likely to be in for violent offenses. 
Within gender, however, the comparisons between foreign born and native 
born are similar. It is worth noting the large increase in the proportion of 
women who were committed for drug offenses. By  1996,46 percent of the 
natives and 57 percent  of the foreign born were admitted to prison  for 
drug offenses. 
Panel B of table 9.2 presents means for those released within six years. 
There are not enough of the “INS hold” and “late hold” foreign born to 
break them out separately in both years. In 1990, one can see that, as with 
the men, the INS-hold foreigners had the longest sentence length and the 
longest time served. The offense distribution overall looks almost identical 
to the admission cohorts since very few women are truncated by our sam- 
ple restriction of serving fewer than six years. As with the men, in  1990 
women with INS holds were much more likely to be in for drug offenses 
than were other women. 
Offenders who have committed crimes in California may also be incar- 
cerated in the federal Bureau of Prisons. In order to complete the descrip- 
9. See published tabulations from the March 1996 CPS at http://www.bls.census.gov/cps/, The Role of Deportation in the Incarceration of Immigrants  363 
tion of immigranthonimmigrant differences in incarceration, the next sec- 
tion considers the effect federal jurisdiction has on inmate populations at 
the state level. 
9.3  Federal Jurisdiction 
Although state and federal jurisdiction are often analyzed in isolation, 
there are important reasons to consider them jointly. The responsibility 
for arresting, trying, and punishing criminal offenders rests primarily with 
state and local governments, yet there are several relevant categories of 
offenses that fall solely under federal jurisdiction, namely immigration of- 
fenses and treason.’O Anti-immigrant advocates often overlook this defini- 
tional issue. For example, the Federation for American Immigration Re- 
form (FAIR) in its literature often cites that 25 percent of federal inmates 
are noncitizensl’ without noting either that the federal system incarcerates 
only about 7 percent of the nation’s inmates (Glaeser, Kessler, and Piehl 
1998) or that 13 percent of the noncitizens are incarcerated for immigra- 
tion violations-crimes  that come only under federal jurisdiction and for 
which citizens (generally) are not at risk.I2 
Most violations of other areas of federal law are also violations of state 
laws. The practical consequences of this concurrent jurisdiction have not 
been well researched, however (see Glaeser, Kessler, and Piehl 1998). Con- 
current jurisdiction is particularly important in the area of drug crimes, 
since criminal acts could be prosecuted under either the relevant state law 
or federal law,  potentially  with very different consequences for the of- 
fender.I3  Time served in the federal system for the same crime is likely to 
be twice as long as in a state prison because federal law requires that in- 
mates serve 85 percent of their nominal sentences. Also, federal inmates 
generally serve time in prison much further from home, which makes visits 
from family and friends much less likely. 
The existence of the federal criminal justice system raises two important 
questions for our analysis of immigration  and state inmates. Are there 
native/foreign born differences in the mix of inmates serving time on “fed- 
eral only” offenses? For those offenses with concurrent jurisdiction, does 
10. The federal government has also been particularly interested in regulating offenses by 
or against federal officials or committed on federal property (DiIulio,  Smith, and Singer 
1995). 
11. See FAIR’S  Web page, “Government Studies on Criminal Aliens,” at http://www.fairus. 
org/04111604.htm. 
12. The percentage of noncitizens entering the prison system with immigration crimes is 
26 percent. This number differs substantially from the percentage of the stock of inmates 
since sentences for immigration  offenses are generally shorter than for  drug and violent 
offenses (Scalia 1996, tables 9 and 12). 
13. While it is constitutional to bring charges against a defendant under both sets of laws 
for the same act, this is rarely done in practice. For a discussion of these jurisdictional issues 
plus a model of the incentives for prosecutors to choose different cases in the two systems, 
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the margin for moving into the federal jurisdiction differ between the for- 
eign born and natives? Because data comparable to our California sample 
do not exist, this section reviews data from several sources, all of which 
require approximations  to the concept  of nativity used elsewhere in this 
paper. 
Table 9.3 reports information  from the U.S.  Sentencing Commission 
monitoring database of all cases resulting in conviction in U.S. district 
courts  in  1994-95.’4 This table  shows that  noncitizens  were  overrepre- 
sented among those from California convicted in US. courts. Noncitizens 
were primarily  convicted  of  immigration  and drug violations.  Further- 
more,  there  are important differences  between  legal  and illegal  immi- 
grants-nearly  60 percent of the illegal immigrant males were convicted 
of immigration violations. However, excluding immigration offenses, drug 
violations were very important to each group, and constitute a larger pro- 
portion of the noncitizens’ offenses than of the citizens’. Therefore, these 
high proportions of immigrant drug offenders may indicate that the for- 
eign born are differentially “missing” from analyses of state prison popula- 
tions. 
A report from the Bureau of Justice Statistics suggests that, for drug 
offenders,  the margin  for noncitizens  to move  into  federal jurisdiction 
may have been lower than for citizens (Scalia 1996). Scalia notes that “non- 
citizens convicted of a Federal drug offense were more likely than citizens 
to have played a minor role in the drug conspiracy. Approximately 29% 
of noncitizens convicted of a drug offense received a downward sentenc- 
ing adjustment for ‘mitigating role,’ compared with  14% of U.S. citizens” 
(Scalia 1996, 1). While these findings have implications for the costs of 
incarcerating  the foreign born in the federal criminal justice system, the 
existence of this system also has implications for the interpretation of re- 
sults for states. If we were able to cleanly connect the data for both prison 
systems, we would find that the California data underestimate the dispro- 
portionate representation  of the foreign born among drug offenders and 
the longer time served by the foreign born (which we show below). 
9.4  Laws and Enforcement 
The information  presented  in tables 9.1 and 9.2 makes clear that the 
fraction of inmates who were foreign born, and the fraction of the foreign 
born with an INS hold on record, increased for both men and women. To 
understand why this happened, it is worth distinguishing the factors that 
affect the criminal justice  system  in  general  from those that  determine 
whether an immigrant is deportable. 
14. The coverage of these data is somewhat broader than statistics on the flow of inmates 
into the Bureau of Prisons, since some of those convicted are not sentenced to incarceration. Table 9.3  Offense Distribution: Convictions in U.S. District Courts, 1994 
Men  Women 
Legal  Illegal  Legal  Illegal 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using the United States Sentencing Commission monitoring database, 1994-95. 366  Kristin F.  Butcher and Anne Morrison Piehl 
During the past decade, several changes have taken place in criminal 
justice policy that, while not aimed at immigrants directly, may nonethe- 
less have had a disproportionate impact on their incarceration. A plethora 
of acts under the heading of the “war on drugs” has increased enforce- 
ment  and penalties  for  violations  involving controlled  substances (see 
Forst  1995; Tonry 1995). Data from our earliest time period, 1986, show 
that immigrants were disproportionately incarcerated for drug-related ac- 
tivity. If one interprets that to mean that the foreign born were dispropor- 
tionately involved in drug crimes, then, as enforcement increased with the 
“war on drugs,”  a  disproportionate  number  of foreign  born would  be 
caught in the net. 
Furthermore, immigrants and others with low levels of income and edu- 
cation may have poor (or no) representation in court. Because of language 
and cultural barriers, the foreign born may be particularly  less likely to 
aid adequately in their own defense. Further, with few exceptions, federal 
law prohibits agencies from using funds from the Legal Services Corpora- 
tion to represent aliens. With the increasing numbers of aliens requiring 
legal services and the expense of providing representation  (due to the re- 
mote location of many detention facilities and prisons), the availability of 
pro bono representation is scarce.15  Thus, aliens may be more likely to be 
convicted than the native born who commit similar crimes. 
There are also changes in the enforcement environment that may have 
had a specific impact on the foreign born. Consider the “war on drugs” 
again. There is a trivial reason this may have disproportionately affected 
the foreign born. Since drugs tend to come from abroad, the couriers are 
often foreign born. As enforcement against drug smugglers increased, it is 
likely that the proportion of foreign born who are apprehended, convicted, 
and incarcerated  also increased. As discussed earlier, this connection is 
worth keeping in mind, since these individuals are not necessarily among 
the some 1 million immigrants admitted for legal permanent resident sta- 
tus each year; rather, they are among the some 25 million people admitted 
each year  on student, business,  and tourist visas. As the discussions of 
immigration and crime become intertwined, it is worth noting that not all 
of the foreign born who are incarcerated were necessarily admitted under 
the U.S. family-based admission criteria for permanent residents. 
There have  also been changes in U.S. policies  toward  criminal immi- 
grants.  Since the United  States  stopped  its  open border  policy  in  the 
187Os, criminal activity has been a basis for both exclusion and deporta- 
tion of those who, until that point, had been legal residents.I6  Only those 
15. These comments were provided in personal communication from Stephen Legomsky, 
31 January 1998. 
16. See Borjas (1990, 27) for a summary of early immigration restrictions. In fact, the first 
attempted regulation of immigration was the Aliens Act of 1798. It legalized the deportation 
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immigrants who have become naturalized citizens are immune to depor- 
tation. Although “crimes of moral turpitude” and a host of other crim- 
inal activities have always been grounds for deportation, deportation was 
pursued rather selectively. As our 1986 data reveal, the foreign born with 
INS hold orders in 1986 were disproportionately incarcerated for violent 
crimes, and officials took longer in placing INS holds on inmates’ records 
compared to later years. 
Congressional legislation during the 1980s took away some of the INS’s 
discretion over deportation proceedings, enlarged the categories of crimi- 
nal activity for which  deportation was  required,  and increased the re- 
sources of enforcement agencies.” The Immigration Reform and Control 
Act (IRCA) of 1986 required the INS to start deportation proceedings as 
soon  as possible  after the conviction  of  a  noncitizen.  The Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act of 1988 introduced the term “aggravated felon” and required 
deportation of all noncitizens convicted of aggravated felonies. As origi- 
nally defined, an aggravated felony consisted of such crimes as murder, 
drug or firearms trafficking, and money laundering. However, the term 
was amended and broadened in 1990 and 1994. By  1996, with the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, the term “aggra- 
vated felon” applied to crimes of theft  or burglary, provided the court 
imposed a sentence of at least one year;18 a conviction for fraud or deceit 
is now an aggravated felony if the loss is $10,000 (Brady and Kesselbrenner 
1997, 6). The Anti-Terrorism  and Effective Death Penalty Act of  1996 
contained some overlapping provisions. Specified grounds for deportation 
in this act included several provisions: “conviction of an aggravated felony, 
conviction of a controlled substance offense, drug addiction or abuse (no 
conviction necessary), conviction of a firearm offense,” and several other 
miscellaneous crimes (Brady and Kesselbrenner 1997, 4). 
Note that these convictions need not result in prison time in order for a 
defendant to be “deportable.” A conviction for a qualified offense that re- 
sulted in a suspended sentence or a sentence of probation meets the grounds 
for deportation. In addition, aggravated felonies need not be committed 
within any given time period following immigration. Therefore, a legal resi- 
dent with one conviction after 20 years in the country would qualify for 
deportation. (In contrast, only those moral turpitude crimes committed 
within 5 years after admission are “qualifying offenses.”) In 1996, the crim- 
17. In fiscal year 1984, the United States budget reports the INS’s total obligations to be 
$518,058,000 (Executive Office of the President 1985, I-N16). By  1996, the total obligations 
are reported to be $2,291,000,000  (Executive Office of the President  1997, 684). In  1994, a 
new section was added to the INS budget entitled “Violent Crime Reduction Programs.” In 
fiscal year 1998, this additional funding was $732,251,000 and was “to remain available until 
expended” on programs to combat crime through immigration control. 
18. These rules create potential horizontal inequities across noncitizens depending on their 
state of residence. In states with longer sentences, immigrants will be more likely to meet the 
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inal grounds for deportability became retroactive, so a legal resident who 
had committed one of these offenses in the past, even if it was not grounds 
for deportation at the time, is now subject to dep~rtation.’~ 
In addition to the changes in the definition of the grounds for deporta- 
tion, Congress also appropriated more funds for enforcement. The Institu- 
tional Hearing Program (IHP) was established in response to the IRCA 
requirement that deportation proceedings be initiated more quickly.20  The 
process is supposed to work as follows: corrections officials identify new 
prisoners as foreign born; INS agents screen these prisoners for deport- 
ability; if an inmate is deportable, a detainer is filed requiring the inmate 
to be released to INS custody upon release from prison; deportation hear- 
ings are scheduled. The hope was that most  deportable inmates would 
complete the entire process during the term of incarceration, and deporta- 
tion would occur at the inmate’s prison release date. (In practice, however, 
many deportable inmates were not identified by this process.)*’ 
The increases in resources to the INS coupled with increasing manage- 
rial attention to criminal aliens have yielded large increases in the numbers 
removed from the United  States. Only 30,464 aliens were deported for 
criminal and narcotics violations over the entire decade of the 1980s (US. 
Department of Justice 1993); in  1997 alone, 50,165 criminal aliens were 
removed (U.S. Department of Justice 1997b). Among the removed crimi- 
nal aliens, 61 percent had been convicted of aggravated felonies and 43 
percent had drug convictions (U.S. Department of Justice 1997b). Fewer 
than 15,000 of the criminal aliens were removed through the Institutional 
Hearing Program (e.g., directly from a correctional institution), evidence 
of incomplete implementation (U.S. Department of Justice 1997c). 
Negotiated  arrangements  for  expediting  the  processing  of  criminal 
aliens continue to develop between local offices of the INS and state and 
local law-enforcement agencies. A recent INS effort, the Law Enforcement 
Support Center, has pilot programs for improving the identification  of 
illegal aliens who commit crimes (McDonald 1997). Because law enforce- 
ment is organized locally, and because populations vary substantially, sys- 
tems must  be adapted  to the practices  of police departments,  sheriffs’ 
19. The law gets quite complicated. According to Legomsky (1997a, 448), “it is necessary 
. . . to distinguish between the effective date  of  a change in the definition of ‘aggravated 
felony’ and the effective dates of the various specific consequences of conviction of an aggra- 
vated felony” (Legomsky’s emphasis). 
20. The discussion of the IHP in this paragraph draws heavily from General Accounting 
Office (GAO, 1997). 
21. A GAO audit of the process found that, during the final six months of  1995,40 percent 
of  a sample of potentially deportable foreign-born inmates had a final deportation order 
upon release from prison and 52 percent had the process completed after release from prison. 
GAO estimated that $63 million in detention costs could have been saved if  the deportation 
process had been completed while inmates were incarcerated (GAO 1997). The Role of Deportation in the Incarceration of Immigrants  369 
offices, and departments of corrections.22  While removal is generally not 
permitted before the sentence is served, 1996 legislation increased the dis- 
cretion of the attorney general to remove nonviolent offenders early (Leg- 
omsky 1997a, 730). 
The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 provided 
“reimbursement” to states for incarceration of  undocumented  alien in- 
mates. This reimbursement gives state officials an incentive to notify the 
federal authorities  of  suspected illegal  immigrant^.^^  This  act  also in- 
creased funding to the INS to proceed with deportation hearings against 
criminal aliens. 
Although only some of these laws were in effect by the time individuals 
in our sample were convicted, they demonstrate the rapidly changing atti- 
tude toward criminal aliens. During the intervening years between each of 
our data sets, new laws were passed either to broaden grounds for deporta- 
tion of criminal aliens or to increase funding to the INS to initiate depor- 
tation proceedings. We  observe changes in  our data that correspond to 
these changes in policy. The expansion in offenses requiring deportation 
is reflected in the extent to which less-serious offenders increasingly have 
INS holds on record (i.e., comparing 1990 and 1996 to 1986) and in the 
upswing in the numbers of criminal aliens awaiting deportation. Addition- 
ally,  our data are consistent with these procedures’ becoming more sys- 
tematic over time. One measure of this is the speed with which the INS 
hold orders were filed. 
There are also several reasons to believe that the foreign born may be 
treated differently within the criminal justice system. These differences in 
treatment may, among other things, increase the costs of incarcerating the 
foreign born.24  For example, in the  1992 decision  United States v.  Re- 
~trepo,~~  it was determined that noncitizens held in the (federal) Bureau of 
Prisons are not allowed to serve any portion of their sentence in minimum 
security facilities or halfway houses. While this decision may be warranted 
if immigrants pose a much greater escape or flight risk than do citizens, it 
will materially increase the costs of incarcerating them.26 
22.  McDonald reports that an assessment of  practices related  to identifying and pro- 
cessing criminal aliens in five states found “wide variations in the nature of  cooperation 
between federal, state, and local agencies” (1997, 7). 
23. In practice, the State Criminal Alien Assistance Program partially reimburses states 
for expenses of incarcerating certain criminal aliens (convicted of one felony or two misde- 
meanors). In fiscal year 1996, the reimbursement rate was 60 cents for each dollar claimed 
(U.S. Department of Justice 1997a). 
24. In this paper, we  focus on postconviction treatment of foreigners. For discussions of 
differential treatment at earlier stages in the criminal justice process, see Hagan and Pal- 
loni (1 997). 
25. United States v. Restrepo, 802F. Supp. 781 (U.S. Dist. 1992). 
26. This also means that noncitizens will serve their sentences under more severe circum- 
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Additionally, there are reasons deportable noncitizens may serve longer 
sentences for the same crime than do citizens. In  Rodriguez  v.  United 
States (1 993),27  the second circuit court, relying on the statutory language 
from the Immigration and Nationality Act, determined that while the INS 
must begin any deportation proceeding as quickly as possible, alien pris- 
oners will be required to serve their complete terms before they may be 
deported. Thus, noncitizens may be required to serve more of their senten- 
ces than citizens.28  Deportable aliens will  spend more time behind bars 
than citizens for two additional reasons. First, they must wait in detention 
until the INS authorities come to get them, so any administrative delay 
will protract  their time served. Second, once the INS authorities collect 
them, they are transferred to INS detention centers awaiting final deci- 
sions on their deportation status and removal to their country of origin.2y 
9.5  Multivariate Analysis of Sentence Length and Time Served 
The previous section reviewed the case law  and legislation that both 
increased the number of deportable aliens and, potentially, increased the 
time they serve on a given sentence relative to citizens and other aliens. In 
this section, we  use data from the California Department of Corrections 
to analyze the effect of an INS hold order on time served for noncitizens 
relative to comparable inmates. 
9.5.1  The Effect of Deportation Holds on 
Sentence Length and Time Served 
In anticipation of our analysis of time actually served, we begin with an 
examination of the effect of INS status on sentence length because the 
sentence is a potentially important control for criminal activity. We con- 
trol for six offense categories, race and ethnicity, and three categories of 
foreign born. The policies outlined above should not increase deportable 
immigrants’ sentence lengths if we  had perfect controls for the details of 
their crimes and their criminal history, and if there were equal treatment 
under the law. We  do not have access to information  on the first two of 
these, and the last is in some doubt. 
We control for six broad offense categories: manslaughter, property, as- 
sault, sex, drug, and other offenses. Although additional offense categories 
27. Rodriguez  v.  United Stares,  994 F 2d  1 10 (2d Cir. 1993). 
28. As corrections agencies and the INS make and implement arrangements as to what 
constitutes “serving one’s sentence,” the extent to which criminal aliens serve more time in 
custody should decline. 
29. While the latter will not be picked up in the analysis in this paper, the approach taken 
in Butcher and Piehl (1998a) does capture the institutionalization of those in deportation 
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are available in the data,30  offense severity is one dimension along which 
bias in the criminal justice system may be manifested. Under determinate 
sentencing, the conviction offense should map into the ~entence.~’  In prac- 
tice, the conviction offense is reached through the discretion of the prose- 
cutor and plea bargaining. Kessler and Piehl(l998) recommend “stepping 
back” from the crime of conviction to that of the original charge in order 
to get closer to the actual action that led to arrest. Since we  do not have 
this earlier information, we use these broader offense categories to avoid 
overcontrolling for the sentence. 
We include several other control variables. Since the foreign born tend 
to be members of racial and ethnic minorities, we  control for black, His- 
panic, and other race. We also include controls for age at admission and 
age at admission squared. Age may affect sentence length, because the 
older an individual is, the more likely she or he will have a longer crimi- 
nal history. 
We also control for three categories of the foreign born: all foreign born, 
those  foreign born with  “INS holds,”  and the foreign born with  “late 
holds.” There are reasons to use each of these comparison groups. First, 
all foreign born in California are likely to have difficulty speaking and 
understanding English. To the extent that this hampers their ability to aid 
in their own defense, they may be more likely to be convicted or to receive 
longer sentences upon convicti~n.~~  Secondly, the foreign born are likely 
to have had less time in the United States, and thus have shorter (domes- 
tic) official criminal records. The “late” INS holds are interesting because 
they may have unobservables  similar to those of the INS-hold foreign 
born, since both are eventually deemed “deportable.” 
Table 9.4 presents  the ordinary  least  squares  (OLS) regressions for 
sentence length for men in 1986 and 1990, for all offenses, drug offenses, 
and property offenses. The left-hand-side variable is the natural log of sen- 
tence length. One would like to estimate the sentence length for all crime 
30. These categories, however, are of questionable usefulness. They appear to be designed 
more for political than research purposes (e.g., many types of drug and sex offenses are 
delineated, while there are few categories of other violent and property crimes). 
3 1. Generally, there are three sentence lengths from which a judge may choose. Adjust- 
ments to these may be made for other circumstances, such as particular  characteristics of 
the crime (such as the use of a firearm) or particular characteristics of the defendant (such 
as having a previous conviction for a violent crime). 
32. A defense lawyer who is aware of the immigration consequences of different convic- 
tions may use these to negotiate with prosecutors. For example, knowing that a particular 
type of charge sets into motion required deportation proceedings, a defense attorney may 
bargain for slightly more time in return for a different charge. This would increase the sen- 
tence length of the “nondeportable” foreign born relative to those with INS holds. While 
this type of deal making does occur, immigration law is a specialty within law and court 
appointed defense attorneys (and their clients) are often not aware of the deportation conse- 
quences of various convictions. Also, it is unclear how acceptable such offers are to district 
attorneys. Table 9.4  Determinants of Log Sentence Length Men Released within Six Years of Admission, by Admission Year 
All Offenses  Drug Offenses  Property Offenses 
1986  1990  1986  1990  1986  1990 
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Notes: Data are from the California Department of Corrections for men who were admitted in  1986 and 1990 and released within six years. “Late hold” 
indicates individuals for whom the “INS hold was enacted after they had been released. All regressions include age at admission, age squared, and a 
constant. The offense groups in the first two columns include manslaughter, assault, sex, drug, property, and other offenses. Numbers in parentheses are 
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categories separately because there were changes in punishments associ- 
ated with these crime categories over these years. However, we  only have 
sufficient data to estimate the two largest crime categories separately. 
Before turning to estimates for the groups of the foreign born, note the 
effects of race and ethnicity. African Americans had significantly shorter 
sentences, all else equal, overall and for property offenses. In 1990, blacks 
convicted of drug offenses had longer sentences than non-Hispanic whites. 
The indicator for Hispanic was negative and significant in all specifica- 
tions. The “other race” indicator was insignificant in most cases. 
The “INS hold” coefficient was large, positive, and significant across all 
specifications. The effect was larger in 1986 than in  1990. The coefficient 
implies that those with INS holds were serving 39.6 percent, 47.2 percent, 
and 45.3 percent longer sentences for all, drug, and property offenses, re- 
spectively, than other “similar” individuals. By  1990, the analogous figures 
were  14.5 percent,  15.2 percent, and 8.3 percent for all, drug, and prop- 
erty offenses, respectively. This is consistent with the fact that the list of de- 
portable crimes was expanding during this time period to include less and 
less serious crimes. 
How should we  interpret this coefficient on “INS hold”? If the offense 
categories control for all pertinent aspects of an individual’s criminal ac- 
tivity, then none of the other variables should matter. Clearly, this is not 
the case. As discussed above, there are several things that are relevant 
for sentencing for which we  have no information: details about the exact 
criminal act and the individual’s criminal history. To the extent that “for- 
eign born” controls for criminal history, we  want to control for it and 
assess the “INS hold” coefficient on its own. To the extent that “INS hold” 
merely indicates that these are the individuals who are committing more 
serious crimes, we  may want to compare the “INS hold” to the “late hold” 
coefficient. These are both groups of  people who  turn  out to be  “de- 
portable,” and  so may  have  similar underlying characteristics to their 
crimes. In this case, “INS hold” seems to add considerably to the sentence 
length since “INS hold” was positive and significant and “late hold” was 
negative and significant across all specifications. Of course, the fact that 
the “late hold” individuals were  not determined to be deportable until 
after their release may indicate either that they had very short sentences 
and were  in and out of  the system before the INS could catch up with 
them, or that they committed lower priority crimes so no one immediately 
looked into their deportation status. If we  want to compare the foreign 
born with INS holds to the native born, we  need to add the “INS hold” 
coefficient to the coefficient on foreign born. INS-hold foreign born re- 
ceived 3-31  percent longer sentences than the native born, depending on 
the year and the specification. 
Table 9.5 reports  the results for sentence length for women  in  1990, 
overall and for drug offenses. There were not enough observations to run 374  Kristin F.  Butcher and Anne Morrison Piehl 
Table 9.5  Determinants of Log Sentence Length Women Released within Six 
Years of Admission, 1990 
All Offenses  Drug Offenses 



































Notes: See notes for table 9.4. 
the  1986 specifications for women, and there were not enough late-hold 
foreigners to include that variable in these regressions. INS-hold foreigners 
receive about 30-35  percent longer sentences than other foreigners, and 
they received about 24-26  percent longer sentences than the native born. 
These effects were similar in direction to those for the men, but they were 
larger than the 1990 effects for men. 
In sum, the foreign born with an INS hold on record received signifi- 
cantly longer sentences than other groups. We  do not have a particular 
interpretation to give to these results. Rather, they inform the upcoming 
results  of  our  analyses of  time  served. To  the extent  that  this reflects 
differences in criminal history or differences in the severity of the crime, 
we want to control for sentence length when we analyze actual time served. 
To  the extent  that  the effect of  “INS hold” reflects bias in  the system 
against this group of noncitizens, we do not want to control for its effects 
when we  analyze time served. We present both specifications in what fol- 
lows. 
Table 9.6 presents  OLS regression results for the natural log of time 
served. All the controls we  used in  the sentence length  regressions are 
included here. In the first regression for each pair, we  add the log of  sen- 
tence length and its square on the right-hand  side.33  The specifications 
that include all offenses show that the foreign born with INS holds served 
significantly longer sentences (by about 6 percent) than did other similar 
33. When the log of sentence length is entered  linearly, the coefficient is significantly 
different from one. Table 9.6  Determinants of Log Time Served Men Released within Six Years of Admission, by Admission Year 
All Offenses  Drug Offenses  Property Offenses 
1986  1990  1986  I990  1986  1990 
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inmates in both years. For drug offenses, the coefficient on “INS hold” 
was .038 (insignificant) in  1986 and .058 in 1990. This figure was slightly 
larger for property offenses, with “INS hold” increasing time served ap- 
proximately 8 percent  in  1986 and  approximately  13 percent  in  1990. 
Those foreign born with a late hold or no hold served less time (in most 
specifications). Compared  to other inmates with  similar characteristics 
and the same sentence length, the INS-hold foreign born served signifi- 
cantly more time. When we  look within drug and property offenses, we 
see that this effect was larger in  1990 than in  1986. This suggests that the 
penalty for being deportable was increasing over time. 
As described above, if  we  want to compare the INS-hold foreign born 
to the native born, we  need to add the coefficients on “INS hold” and 
“foreign born.”  Whether  or not  this  is  the  right  exercise depends  on 
whether the INS-hold foreign born are more similar to other foreign born 
or to natives in terms of prior criminal history and behavior within the 
prison system. These data cannot answer this question, so it is worth not- 
ing that the differences in time served between the INS-hold foreign born 
and the native born were smaller than between the INS-hold foreign born 
and those foreign born without a hold order. However, except for the case 
of drug offenses in  1986, the INS-hold foreign born served significantly 
longer than the native born, and the differential was between 3  and 5 
percent. 
If one believes that all effects of “INS hold” on sentence length in the 
previous tables were the result of differences in the severity of the criminal 
act, then controlling for sentence length in these specifications should ac- 
count for this source of differences. The effect of INS holds on time served 
in these specifications can only result from differences in preconfinement 
credits, behavior in prison, or differences in treatment within the criminal 
justice system. Preconfinement credits come about if the individual is held 
during trial. This is more likely if someone is unable to make bail or is 
more likely to have a trial. There is some evidence that noncitizens are 
less likely to be free on bail before trial (Hagan and Palloni  1997). The 
relationship between citizenship and plea-bargaining is more complicated, 
If noncitizens have poor legal representation, they may be more likely to 
accept a plea bargain. On the other hand, the current deportation conse- 
quences of a felony conviction may lead noncitizens to go to trial. In the 
latter case, the subsample of  those convicted noncitizens will have longer 
average sentences (since they  do not receive any  discount from  guilty 
pleas). Then, the inclusion of sentence length will tend to bias downward 
the coefficient on “INS hold.” 
We  have no direct information on behavior in prison,  but have no a 
priori reason to believe “INS hold” foreign born would have worse behav- 
ior than the other groups. The 1991 Survey of Inmates of  State Prisons 
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variables on “rule breaking” while incarcerated. For this check, we  were 
able to compare citizens to noncitizens, which is not exactly comparable 
to our California analyses. Due to the small sample sizes, we  could not 
always look at the desired level of detail. (For example, the survey con- 
tained no female noncitizens in California prisons who had broken a ma- 
jor rule.) In the national sample (with state fixed effects) there was no 
difference in the extent of rule breaking between citizen and noncitizen 
males when all offenders were considered together or among only drug of- 
fenders. Among women, citizens had statistically significantly higher rates 
of rule breaking. For male California inmates only, again there was no 
difference in behavior. In none of the specifications we ran for rule break- 
ing was the coefficient on citizen negative. Thus, we  do not believe that 
behavioral differences in prison explain the finding that those with INS 
holds serve a longer proportion of their sentences. 
Another  potential problem in the interpretation of the INS hold co- 
efficient is reverse causality. Suppose that for some unknown reason (e.g., 
behavior  in  prison,  preconfinement  credits),  some  individuals  stay  in 
prison longer for a given sentence length. The INS would then have longer 
to identify who was  deportable and then file hold orders. Longer time 
served would, in effect, cause inmates to be deemed deportable. We do not 
think our results are driven by reverse causation. As mentioned earlier, in 
1986 it may have been the case that deportation holds were filed selectively 
and the longer one was in  prison,  the greater  the chance that officials 
would decide to investigate one’s  deportation status.  But by  1990, the 
placement of INS holds had become much more systematic. Over three- 
quarters of all holds were placed within the first four months of detention. 
As a further check for possible reverse causation, we reran the regressions 
in table 9.6 on the sample of individuals who were sentenced to at least 
two years in prison. We then limited the definition of “INS hold” to those 
whose hold was placed within three months of admission. Among this 
group, it cannot be the case that reverse causation drives our results, as 
reverse causation implies that those who stay in prison longer are more 
likely to be identified as deportable. This group serves a long sentence and 
the INS hold is filed almost immediately. Our results using this sample are 
very similar to the reported results in table 9.6. For example, inmates with 
INS holds  served  11.2 percent longer in  1986 and 11.5 percent longer 
in 1990. 
The final explanation for the positive relationship between “INS hold” 
and time served, that there are differences in treatment, is consistent with 
the idea that there are statutory reasons why these noncitizens must serve 
out their  sentences prior to deportation,  and that there might be some 
delay before the INS can transfer them to a deportation facility. 
If one believes that the effects of “INS hold” on sentence length repre- 
sent some sort of improper bias toward this group, then one would not 378  Kristin F.  Butcher and Anne Morrison Piehl 
Table 9.7  Determinants of Log Time Served Women Released within Six Years 
of Admission, 1990 
All Offenses  Drug Offenses 







































































Notes: See notes to table 9.4. 
want to control for it in the time-served regressions. The second column 
in each year/offense group shows the results excluding the log of  sentence 
length and its square. In this case, the effect of having an INS hold on 
one’s record is enormous. INS-hold foreign born served between 50 and 
60 percent longer sentences in 1986. This effect was much smaller in 1990, 
only about 23 percent. This is undoubtedly because the list of offenses 
that were considered grounds for deportation increased dramatically in 
these two time periods, so the foreign inmates with INS holds have shorter 
sentences on average in 1990, although there are more of them. 
Table 9.7 shows the results for time served for women. We could not 
perform identical analyses to those for the men because the sample sizes 
were too small. The results controlling for sentence length show that the 
foreign born with INS holds served about 12 percent more time when we 
consider all offenses together. Within drug offenses, there was a positive 
but insignificant effect. The race and ethnicity variables similarly have lit- 
tle effect here. Similar to the men, when sentence length is not included, 
the coefficient on “INS hold” was very large-this  group serves about 45 
percent longer. 
9.5.2 
As described in section 9.4, policies toward criminal aliens have become 
increasingly severe. Although some of these policies took effect between 
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1986 and 1990, more were instituted between 1990 and 1996. It is worth- 
while, then, to investigate more recent evidence. 
While we have data from 1996, we only observe these inmates until 30 
June 1997. In order to observe a completed spell of incarceration, an in- 
mate would have had to serve approximately one year. In order to analyze 
comparable samples across the years, for each year we include only those 
who were admitted during the first six months of a year and released by 
the end of June of the following calendar year. This new subsample shifts 
the offense distribution of inmates away from violent crimes and toward 
drug and property crimes. Nonetheless, there are a substantial number of 
men who serve approximately a year in prison. For women, however, the 
sample sizes are too small to analyze such short terms. 
Table 9.8 shows the OLS estimates for the natural log of time served for 
this sample of men serving short prison terms and, in the last row,  the 
marginal effects of “INS hold” for being included in this subsample. These 
regressions are analogous to those in table 9.6, although the log of sen- 
tence length and its square are always included. Once again, we  show the 
estimates for all offense groups combined,  and for drug and property 
offenses separately. 
The point of this exercise is to investigate the magnitude of the “INS 
hold” coefficient over time. The extent to which these coefficients are com- 
parable depends on whether the underlying distributions of inmates are 
similar over the decade. This is a problem generally in periods when incar- 
ceration policy and enforcement environments are changing, but it may 
be a particular problem in these specifications since the sample is trun- 
cated to include only those with relatively short sentences. We will take up 
later the implications of the selection into this sample and whether these 
coefficients can be generalized to the broader prison population. 
Looking across the columns of table 9.8, we can see that the effect of 
“INS hold” on time served dramatically increased from 1986 to 1996. In 
1986, the foreign born with INS holds on record did not serve significantly 
different time from other inmates. By  1990, they served between 7 and 14 
percent longer. By  1996, the foreign born under INS hold orders served 
20-25  percent longer than other similar inmates. 
Do these striking changes across the years represent a real change in 
the treatment of foreign-born inmates under INS hold orders, or do they 
result simply from a change in the underlying distribution of  who is in- 
cluded in the short term sample? Consider the last row of the table. This 
reports the marginal effect of “INS  hold” (estimated using a probit model) 
on being in this short term sample, controlling for the complete list of 
variables listed in the time-served regressions. For all offense groups com- 
bined and the subset of drug offenders, INS-hold foreign born were sig- 
nificantly less likely to be in this short term sample in 1986 and 1990. By 
1996, the INS-hold inmates in these offense groups were no different from Table 9.8  Determinants of Time Served. Men Who Served Short Terms, by Admission Year 
All Offenses  Drug Offenses  Property Offenses 
1986  1990  1996  1986  1990  1996  1986  1990  1996 
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-  1.258 
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-0.003 
Notes: See notes to table 9.4. See text for description of sample. 
aThis is the marginal effect of “INS hold” from a probit regression for whether the individual is in this short term sample. The probits include the same 
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other inmates in terms of their probability of being in this sample. Thus, 
there is some evidence that  the selection into this sample has changed 
over time. 
How important is this for the comparability of these estimates? It is 
difficult to sign the “selection bias” without a great deal of further infor- 
rnati~n.~~  However, note that the selection into the short term sample does 
not appear to have changed over time for the subset of inmates convicted 
of property offenses. An INS hold order has no significant relationship to 
the probability of being in the short term sample for any of the years for 
property  offenders. Nonetheless,  the coefficients on “INS hold” in the 
time-served regressions for property offenders show a very similar pattern 
to that in the other specifications: the impact increased steeply over time. 
There are reasons to believe that the magnitude of these impacts may 
not generalize to the rest of the population. Suppose the “INS hold” effect 
comes mainly from bureaucratic delay-it  takes time for the INS to com- 
plete deportation hearings and to take charge of a deportable alien. The 
length of this delay will be proportionally longer for those who are serving 
shorter periods of time overall. However, comparing the size of the “INS 
hold” effect in table 9.8 to that in table 9.6 further supports our interpreta- 
tion that something fundamental has changed in the treatment of inmates 
based on their INS hold status, and our sample selection is not driving 
these results. In the former table, we have the experience of the one-fourth 
to one-fifth of the population  serving the shortest terms. The effect of 
having an “INS hold” in 1986 was insignificant for those serving short 
terms, where it was positive in table 9.6. In 1990, however, there was little 
difference in the magnitude of the coefficients for “INS hold” between the 
short term and broader populations. 
We were interested in whether the experience of Mexicans differed from 
that of  other foreign-born inmates. In particular, it seemed likely that im- 
provements in the processing of criminal aliens for deportation would be 
easiest to achieve for Mexican citizens, both because they constitute the 
largest number of foreign born in California prisons and due to the physi- 
cal proximity of Mexico. Interestingly, we found no evidence (1) that those 
inmates with INS holds who were born in Mexico served a lower propor- 
tion of their sentence than other inmates with INS holds, or (2) that there 
34. There are some examples where the selection would work to bias downward the impact 
of INS hold on time served in the short term sample. Consider the case where the reason 
for the impact of  INS hold is purely due to bureaucratic delay. Suppose further that the 
prison authorities become better over time at identifying who is a deportable alien and mov- 
ing them from the CADOC into INS custody and that bureaucratic delay is proportionately 
longer for shorter sentences. In the later period, a higher fraction of aliens under INS hold 
orders would be included in the short term subsample. Then, in the later period, the average 
proportion of sentence served will fall due to the addition of these people with longer senten- 
ces and therefore lower proportion served. 382  Kristin F.  Butcher and Anne Morrison Piehl 
was a reduction (over time) in the proportion of sentence served by Mexi- 
cans relative to other inmates (all with INS holds). 
9.6  Conclusion 
Noncitizens are at risk for deportation if they are convicted of criminal 
offenses. The character of that risk has changed substantially over the past 
decade due to (1) legislation broadening the list of offenses that “qualify” 
for deportation and making certain provisions retroactive, (2) court deci- 
sions clarifying the terms of confinement for inmates facing deportation, 
(3)  increases in  resources  for  enforcement  against  criminal  aliens, (4) 
shifting emphasis of enforcement toward  drug crimes, (5) reductions in 
the discretion allowed the INS in enforcing deportation provisions of the 
law, and (6) the introduction of financial incentives for states to identify 
noncitizens in their prison populations. 
Our analysis of the inmates in California state prisons documents the 
current  environment  for  criminal  aliens  and  the  extent  of  the  recent 
changes in that environment. The legislative changes have had a large im- 
pact on California’s prisoners. Fully 75 percent of male, and 33 percent of 
female, foreign-born inmates entering the system in  1996 had INS holds 
on their records. Those inmates with INS holds served longer in prison 
than similar native- or foreign-born inmates. The results also suggest that 
the differential in time served has been increasing over time, at least for 
inmates with relatively short sentences. It is possible that these differentials 
will narrow with time, if their cause is administrative delay and improve- 
ments are made. 
Yet  even if  these differentials are temporary, they impose substantial 
costs. First, the inmates themselves bear the cost of serving longer terms 
behind bars. Without a full accounting of how time served in prison inter- 
acts with time spent in detention centers, it is difficult to place a value on 
this cost. While it is possible that inmates are better off  serving longer 
sentences because options for appeal are limited after deportation, there 
is no evidence that this time can be utilized by  inmates for their appeals. 
More generally, we are not aware of any studies of the impact of the recent 
developments in the treatment of criminal aliens on the deportation due 
process or on living conditions in deportation centers. Given the abrupt 
shifts in policy in a period of high immigration, it would not be surprising 
to find multiple bottlenecks in the process. If that is the case, the costs 
described in this paper severely understate the social costs of recent legis- 
lation regarding criminal aliens. 
Second, for criminal justice as a whole, there is the question of the op- 
portunity cost of resources. How would these cells be used if noncitizens 
served the same terms as citizens? It is possible that there would be no 
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are borne by the inmates and guards operating in overly crowded condi- 
tions, which may or may not be a cause for concern. It is not hard to 
imagine, however, that the opportunity cost of these cells is additional 
offenders on probation who might otherwise be incarcerated. 
Third, our results suggest that the direct costs of incarcerating immi- 
grants are increasing because of the increase in absolute numbers and the 
differential time served by  deportable aliens. How are those direct costs 
allocated across jurisdictions? Criminal aliens under deportation orders 
are released from prison and transported to INS deportation facilities. If 
the additional time in California prisons is used to adjudicate their depor- 
tation cases, then this extra time in state prisons may result in less time in 
INS deportation facilities, saving the federal government money. From the 
inmates’ point of view, it may not matter where one resides except to the 
extent that one environment is preferable to another. However, from the 
state’s point of view, it may matter a great deal. The longer individuals are 
in their prisons, the more it costs the state. While the federal government 
has begun to allocate funds to compensate states for criminal aliens, cur- 
rently the reimbursement rate is much less than one. 
The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 provided 
“reimbursement” to states for incarceration  of undocumented alien in- 
mates. This reimbursement gives state officials an incentive to notify the 
federal authorities of suspected illegal immigrants. In practice, the State 
Criminal Alien Assistance Program (SCAAP) partially reimburses states 
for expenses of incarcerating certain criminal aliens (convicted of one fel- 
ony or two misdemeanors).  In fiscal year  1996, the reimbursement rate 
was 60 cents for each dollar claimed (U.S. Department of Justice 1997a). 
While 60 percent of these costs are being “reimbursed,” it may not be 
sufficient to cover the costs associated with the longer terms served. First, 
capital costs are not included in the reimbursable amounts (U.S.  Depart- 
ment  of Justice  1997a). Second, the “extra” time served by  deportable 
aliens is sufficient to overcome the benefits of SCAAP funds. Using the 
time served of the native born as a proxy for the “base cost” of incarcera- 
tion in the absence of the INS deportation policy, the state loses money 
by identifying potentially deportable inmates when the multiplier on time 
served for deportable aliens is less than one over the reimbursement rate. 
Some of the estimates of the “time-served multiplier” in this paper suggest 
that even at a 60 percent reimbursement rate, California is close to the 
point of losing money by identifying deportable aliens. Further, the reim- 
bursement  rate is a function of the claims, since the appropriation  for 
SCAAP is fixed. Therefore, if claims from states increase, the reimburse- 
ment rate could fall dramatically. So at the same time the federal govern- 
ment  began  to share in the cost of incarcerating alien inmates, it also 
passed additional laws governing the terms of incarceration that had sub- 
stantial impacts on state governments. 384  Kristin F.  Butcher and Anne Morrison Piehl 
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